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Abstract. This paper presents a conceptual refinement of agent cogni-
tive architecture inspired from the beliefs-desires-intentions (BDI) and
the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) models, with an emphasis on
different belief facets. This enables us to investigate the impact of per-
sonality and the way that an agent weights its internal beliefs and social
sanctions on an agent’s actions. The study also uses the concept of cogni-
tive dissonance associated with the fairness of institutions to investigate
the agents’ behaviour. To showcase our model, we simulate two histori-
cal long-distance trading societies, namely Armenian merchants of New-
Julfa and the English East India Company. The results demonstrate the
importance of internal beliefs of agents as a pivotal aspect for following
institutional rules.
Keywords: Institutions · BDI · Agent-based simulation · Facets of belief
· Cognitive dissonance.
1 Introduction
This paper extends a mental architecture to model dynamics in an agent’s cog-
nition. In other words, this paper presents a cognitive architecture inspired from
the belief-desire-intention model (BDI) [10] and the theory of planned behaviour
(TPB) [20] to investigate agents’ interactions with institutions.
In this study, we use agents to divide a complex social system into smaller
action components. Also, an agent impacts the system through its decisions.
A challenge in agent-based simulation is modelling the agents decision-making
process (i.e. action deliberation) [7]. A class of studies addresses this challenge by
employing the beliefs-desires-intentions (BDI) cognitive architecture. Some well-
known extensions of the BDI cognitive architecture include the BOID [11], EBDI
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[36] and the BRIDGE [18]. Also, a formalisation of BDI (n-BDI) was presented to
take into consideration the norms and their internalisation [17]. Some researchers
employed the BDI architecture to model agents’ cooperation in institutionalised
multi-agent systems [6,8]. In some studies, different components of information
are considered in modelling agent architecture [13]. However, the stated study
distinguishes the stored information based on their types and does not address
the agents’ interpretations given their enforcing meta-roles.
To our knowledge, none of the works in the area have taken into account a
multi-faceted characterisation of beliefs as behavioural moderators, so as to pro-
duce nuanced behavioural outcomes that respond to the context and embedding
of the agents therein. In this study, we are thus inspired from the BDI cognitive
architecture and different belief facets of TPB. Also, we model the impact of dif-
ferent belief facets on agent decisions by drawing on extant social-psychological
theories. More precisely, we model how institutional characteristics, including
the fairness of institutions, impact agents’ decisions. The impact of fairness on
agents’ decisions was studied by several researchers [35,28,29], in terms of fair
behaviour of agents. In the stated studies the fairness concerned how individual
agents punish each other, not the organisation (i.e. the focus of this paper).
Before providing the paper’s organisation, we need to clarify that the nature
of simulation and case studies contain some specification. Therefore, the sim-
ulation section cannot use the agent architecture as one may expect. The rest
of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses our cognitive architec-
ture. Section 3 discusses operationalisation of the central aspects of the model.
Section 4 sketches a comparative overview of two historical cases, along with a
simulation model for those societies that incorporates the proposed architecture.
Section 5 presents the simulation results for the two societies. Section 6 discusses
the findings and provides concluding remarks.
2 An overview of the cognitive architecture
Our cognitive model inspired by the BDI and TPB models is depicted in Figure
1. It includes a decision-making module that is expanded in the same figure in
grey. What follows discusses different modules and their connections with one
another. The architecture separates inputs, here referred to as “Events” that
are external to the reasoning process from the actual cognitive architecture that
operates on these inputs. The Cognitive architecture block represents an agent’s
cognitive decision-making components. Any action performed by an agent in a
given iteration will be an input event for the agent itself and other agents in its
social environment in the next iteration. For instance, an agent’s cheating action
in time t will be an action recognised by associated agents for the next period
(t+ 1). In the following, we will discuss the internal components and underlying
assumptions of the architecture in more detail.
What follows discusses different modules and their connections with one an-
other. As can be seen, there are two separate blocks, namely a left block called
‘Events’ and a right block called ‘Cognitive architecture’. The Events block rep-
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Action
Organisational 
(police)
Societal (peers)
Societal
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Internal Beliefs
Events
Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of the proposed cognitive architecture. The inten-
tion/decision module of the cognitive architecture is expanded in the dashed box (bot-
tom block). The relationships between the modules of the cognitive architecture and
the sub-modules of the “intention/decision module” is given by dashed-lines.
resents the events from an outside environment. The Cognitive architecture block
represents an agent’s cognitive decision-making components. Note that when an
action is performed by an agent, it will be an event for agents in the next itera-
tion. What follows discusses the modules of cognitive architecture.
– Roles: An agent has a set of roles in society that indicate how a given rule
impacts it [37].
– Beliefs: To model beliefs, we are inspired by idea of different belief facets
[20], such as Fishbein and Ajzens Reasoned Action/Planned Behaviour ap-
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proach, but propose a variation of the belief facets. We consider three differ-
ent punitive/rewarding components (for brevity we discuss them in terms of
costs), based on the agent’s internal acceptance of the rule (internal belief),
its perception of societal support for the rule (perceived norms), and its be-
lief about the purpose of the rule (rule-understanding). We use the example
of an agent called Alex crossing an intersection when the light is red which
is in violation of a traffic light abidance law when he takes a critically ill
person to hospital:
• Internal beliefs (B): This indicates an agents subjective preference
for rule interpretation (or rules objective/purpose). Breaking this im-
poses mental costs on an agent, whether or not others observe the action
(inspired by behavioural beliefs [20]). Examples of such beliefs of Alex
include B.1: all rules must be followed and B.2: this rule is because of
the new mayor’s non-sensical policies.
• The perceived norms (N): This component indicates an agent’s per-
ception of societal support for the rule (e.g. possible sanctions such as
rebukes). Breaking these perceived norms imposes costs on an agent if
other agents identify and sanction the violation (inspired by normative
beliefs [20]). Alex may make different decisions under different situations
based on his perceived norms, such as N.1: when no one is around, and
N.2: when there are some of his neighbours all waiting for the light to
turn green.
• Rule-understanding (C): This component represents the rule as an
agent understands it. This may differ from the real intention of the rule-
maker. This is enforced by agents who have the duty of monitoring,
reporting, and punishing the violators. This component has the most
rigid punishments, such as dismissal, repaying the costs, and jailing.
For executing this component, the system needs some official reports
about the agents’ behaviour (a formalised version of control beliefs [20]).
Examples of theses include C.1: there is no police around, C.2: there is
a working traffic control camera, and C.3: Alex may think he is allowed
to cross the intersection the way that ambulances do (i.e. he thinks he
would not be punished by the police).
– Desires: Agents have different desires with respect to the environment, their
personalities, and the context, such as goals and ideal preferences.
– Personality: Personality of an agent impacts different aspects, such as its
learning method and the way it weights its beliefs. We use MBTI (Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator) [34] personality types. MBTI categorises personal-
ity types based on four dimensions: Introverted-Extraverted (I-E), Sensing-
iNtuitive (S-N), Feeling-Thinking (F-T), and Judging-Perceiving (J-P). These
dimensions are defined as follows:
• Introverted versus Extraverted (I-E): This indicates where energy is ori-
ented, or attitudes come from.
• Sensing versus iNtuitive (S-N): This differentiates agents based on their
Perceiving methods (i.e. collecting objective or abstract information).
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• Feeling versus Thinking (F-T): This indicates how an agent makes deci-
sions and judges (i.e. decisions are based on the demonstrable rationality
or personal and social values).
• Judging versus Perceiving (J-P): This indicates how fast a person wants
to reach a conclusion and ‘achieve closure’. Also, “it describes the orien-
tation to the extraverted world for every type”[34].
These dimensions indicate the extreme points (i.e. a person who is more
Introverted is considered to be I).3
Another method used for the same purpose, i.e. to classify personalities, is
called the Big Five personality factors [22]. The aspects (which are called
traits by the designers) are measured by the model and its revised versions
are: Agreeableness (the tendency to be cooperative or likeable), Conscien-
tiousness (the extent to which an agent is achievement-oriented, dependable,
and organised), Extraversion (how far an agent is socially-oriented, ambi-
tious, and active), Openness (an agent’s openness to experience and being
unconventional), and Neuroticism (the inability of an agent to adjust to
positive psychological states) [16].
– Skills and capabilities: Some determinants of an agent’s behaviour and
the impacts of such behaviours are its skills and capabilities.
– Intention and decision: An agent’s intention to take an action and its
decision about the final action is formed in this module (coloured in grey).
The decision process includes normalising inputs based on aspects such as
learnt parameters, personality, and roles, which results in an action. This
action can be a modification of beliefs and roles or only performing a task.
This module is at the core of the architecture and discussed in depth in the
following section.
2.1 Intention and decisions module
This module is at the core of the architecture and indicated by grey and dashed
box in Figure 1. The dashed lines in Figure 1 indicate all the relationships with
the components now external to the decision module, including the visually con-
flated tripartite belief structure with its differentiated enforcement mechanisms
explored previously. The components and moderators that integrate these in an
agents final decision are discussed below:
– Monitoring: This block indicates an agent’s belief about the chances of be-
ing punished by each of the three belief facets for a given violation. Note that
the internal belief component does not need external monitoring mechanisms
to work.
– Punishments/rewards: As discussed earlier, the punishments/rewards as-
sociated with internal beliefs and perceived norms depend on the agents
3 In our model agents may have different values associated with different dimensions
and this weight impacts their behaviour. Note that the weights are complementary
(i.e. 10% Introverted means 90% Extraverted).
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beliefs. However, the rules generally have explicit and less ambiguous conse-
quences than social norms in terms of punishment and rewards.
– Modifiers: As discussed earlier, an agent may decide about modifying its
internal beliefs, role, and beliefs about the system for reasons such as cogni-
tive dissonance (incurred costs for inconsistent internal beliefs [4]) and new
information. This block thus functions as a moderator across the different
influence factors.
– Learning: This block indicates an agent’s interpretation of its observations,
suggestions, and past information. Furthermore, the agent can increase its
skills (including general skills) by observation or by practising over time.
– Intentions and action decisions: This block coordinates the decisions
with cognitive or organisational consequences in terms of performing modi-
fications or turning an intention into an action.
To have a better understanding of the way these modules work, let us explore
those from a process perspective. First, an agent accounts for the consequences
of an action with respect to monitoring and punishment/rewards. It also learns
and updates its learning of the system’s characteristics with respect to its obser-
vations, and experience. Then given an agent’s intention, it assesses and revises
its cognition to take an action. If the agent decides to modify the beliefs and
roles, it uses the modifier for doing so. The agent also improves its cognition
about system characteristics by employing a learning procedure to improve and
modify its understanding.
In the following, we attempt to draw general links between weighing of beliefs
and empirical data, so as to replicate diverse compliance behaviour as found in
real-world settings.
2.2 Impact of personality
As depicted in Figure 1, personality influences the decision module (i.e. an
agent’s personality impacts its decision). Furthermore, the decision module is
a mediator for modifying different cognitive aspects (e.g. to resolve cognitive
dissonance). In the following we discuss the impact of personality on an agent’s
utility function.
Weighting perceived norms and internal beliefs: To model the impacts
of personality on norm conformance, we use the result of correlations between
behavioural tendencies as measured by the California Psychological Inventory
(CPI) [23,32]. The measured aspect of interest for us is the classification of
agents into the norm following vs. -questioning groups. The correlations between
the CPI scales and the MBTI scores indicated that Sensing and Judging (S-J)
in the MBTI personality types are correlated to norm-favouring personalities
[21]. Conversely, iNtuitive-Perceiving agents (N-P) appear to have the strongest
tendency to question norms (i.e. weigh their internal beliefs higher than the
perceived norms).
Dynamics in internal beliefs: Perceived fairness of the system has dis-
parate impacts on the agents’ behaviour in terms of rule-following. The Thinking-
Feeling (agreeableness for Big Five [22]) aspect significantly influences agents’
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behaviour [12,40]. The impact of perceived fairness on “organisational retalia-
tory behaviour” that was measured by several studies [1,12,40] indicate that an
agent deliberately changes its behaviour as a reaction to an unjust situation.
Mobility versus residency: Residency in a place gradually leads to for-
mation of friendship among agents; also, friendships have certain impacts on the
agent’s behaviour [3]. The Feeling types, weight keeping harmony in the society
more [34]. In our model, this effort can be modelled, based on the weights of the
connections.
Having provided a high-level overview of the agent’s cognition and decision-
making modules, we describe an agent decision-making procedure using an ex-
ample. For this purpose, we consider the condition under which an agent (A)
observes that another agent (B) uses the company’s properties for self-interest.
First, we state how the Cognitive architecture impacts agent A’s decisions. Given
the architecture presented in Figure 1, the agent A’s role impacts its decision.
For example, if agent A is a manager of agent B reporting the action might be
considered as a part of its responsibilities, while if it is a peer of agent B the
same behaviour (i.e. reporting agent B) might be considered as whistle-blowing.
Such a change in role impacts agent A’s beliefs about its actions — i.e. agent A
may consider whistle-blowing the same as a betrayal to its friendship with agent
B.
Also, agent A has different beliefs (i.e. facets of belief) regarding whistle-
blowing. For example, it may consider the rules too strict and considers the action
a mild violation (internal belief) — e.g. agent B used company’s copy machine
to make copies of its own documents and the rule dictates firing of employees
for such an action. Furthermore, agent A may have learnt that most of his
colleagues consider whistle-blowing as a taboo (perceived norm). Finally, agent
A interpretation of the rule may differ from the real intention of the company
— e.g. company does not consider using a copy machine for making copies of a
document as a violation.
Agent A’s desires, personality, and skills and capabilities impact its decision.
In the example stated earlier, maybe the agent A has certain desires for whistle-
blowing [9], such as hatred of agent B. Agent A’s personality impacts its desires,
skills [27], and weighting its different belief facets [21] (see Subsection 2.2 for
a clarification). Agent A’s normalises its inputs in the intention and decisions
resulting in the final action.
We use the stated example to describe an example to clarify how intention
and decisions module impacts an agent’s final action. As indicated in Figure 1,
agent A’s decisions are impacted by some external factors, including monitoring
and punishment means. For instance, if agent A decides to report agent B’s
behaviour, it may change its mind to avoid social sanctions when the rest of it
colleagues are present in the manager’s room (i.e. punishment and monitoring for
perceived norm). Under the same circumstances, agent A may decide to report
agent B, because its manager identified agent B’s behaviour and there are strict
punishments for collusion among agents (i.e. punishment and monitoring for
rules).
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To explain the learning and modifiers modules consider the earlier situation.
Agent A learns the organisation’s intentions of rules, its peers’ expectations,
and the punishments and rewards associated with a behaviour and modifies its
earlier beliefs based on collected information and its observations. Also, there
are situations such as agent A’s loyalty to the organisation which bring it into
the conflict between its peers’ expectations. Therefore, agent A is afflicted with
the cognitive dissonance that needs to be resolved by modifying its beliefs. This
is exemplified by showing how smokers who were aware of the harms ranked
their smoking habit milder than their counterparts [43] (i.e. changed their beliefs
about their smoking behaviour). Note that this modification of beliefs impacts
agents’ future behaviours.
The stated example clarifies how different modules interact. However, there
are instances such as the agency problem (known as the principal-agent problem)
where the monitoring cannot be performed easily [38]. The principal-agent prob-
lem concerns the dilemma where the self-interested decisions of a party (agent)
impact the benefits of the other person on whose behalf these decisions are made
(principal) [33]. Note that we consider utilitarian decisions made by agents who
play an incomplete information game.4 In such games, agents learn the system’s
characteristics over time and use a utility function to make a decision. In the
following section, we describe how we operationalise an agent’s decision-making
process by defining its utility function.
3 Operationalisation
In this section, we concisely explain how an agent makes its decisions. We briefly
describe an agent’s utility function and the way it forms and updates its per-
ception of norms. Note that an agent learns system’s characteristics based on its
personality,
3.1 Agent’s decision utility function
Agent A takes an action (x) that maximises its utility function presented in
Equation 1 (UA(x)). The utility function has four parts. The first part indicates
the revenue that agent A earns for an action (R(x)). The second part shows
how the agent is mentally punished for such an action (IBPA(x)), given its
personality
(
(NA + PA)/2
)
.
UA(x) =R(x)−
(
IBPA(x)× NA + PA
2
)
−(
(PNA(x)×NMA)×
(
1− NA + PA
2
))− (RP (x)×RM(x)) (1)
The third term shows the agent’s perception of the punishment by its con-
nections (social sanctions). Agent A estimates this, based on its perception of
4 This approach was used for modelling agency problems [39].
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punishment for such an action (PNA(x)), and it is moderated based on its
estimation of its connections’ monitoring strength (NMA) and its personality(
1 − (NA + PA)/2
)
. Finally, it takes account of organisational punishment re-
garding violation (RP (x)) and moderates its impact, based on its estimation of
organisational monitoring (RM(x)). The next subsection discusses how agent A
estimates monitoring strength associated with norms.
3.2 Perception of norms
The perception of norms differs from that of the rule by the vagueness of pun-
ishments associated with norms. To model an agent’s perception of norms, we
should note that a person expresses his/her beliefs, based on the weight he/she
allocates to people’s expectations. To consider this effect, we consider the impact
of personality on an agent’s norm conformance (i.e. expectations with undefined
consequences).
PN tA = wi×
(∑i∈CA,N EN ti
KA
+
(KA −KA,N )× PN t−1i
KA
)
+ (1− wi)× PN t−1A
(2)
Equation 2 shows how agent A (agent of interest) collects its associated
agents’ opinions about the norm (they may express their opinions different than
their real internal beliefs), and updates the society’s expectations from itself at
time t
(
PN tA
)
(in former formula we skipped t for simplicity). The agent asso-
ciates some weights with the recent information (i.e. wi). Furthermore, the agent
averages the recommended scores by its connections with whom it has strong
relationships (i.e. the associated wi ≥ 0.5). From those connections, it takes
account of the ones who have at least the same experience as itself; we call the
subset of such members from CA (i.e. the whole connections of A) as CA,N . Also,
KA and KA,N indicate the number of members of CA and CA,N , respectively.
This procedure states that an agent would not ask for less experienced agents’
recommendations because of the feeling that it knows better. Furthermore, an
agent does not criticise people’s expectations unless it knows the audience well
(i.e. the ones who have a higher wiA). In addition, agent A assumes that the
rest of the connections (i.e. KA − KA,N ) realise the norm the same as himself(
PN t−1i
)
. Then the agent associates the rest of the weights (i.e. 1−wi) with its
past perception about expectations (i.e. PN t−1A ).
Now we discuss how other agents express their beliefs to agent A. Agent i
does it through a weighting of its perception of social expectations (PNi) and
its beliefs (IBi). Equation 3 shows how weighting the outer world impacts an
agent’s expression of beliefs. As discussed earlier, the personality of agent i (a
friend of agent A) impacts its expression of its beliefs about the outer world’s
expectations. EN ti indicates agent i’s expression of what people do and what
they should do at time t. As discussed earlier, the iNtuitive and Perceiving
aspect of an agent decreases weights given to other people’s expectations; hence,
agent i straightforwardly expresses its own beliefs and expectations at that time
(i.e. IBti , the first term on the right of Equation 3). The second term on the right
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shows the opposite — i.e. how personality of agent i impacts its expression of
ideas, based on the value it associates with other agent’s expectations (i.e. PN ti ).
EN ti =
(
IBti ×
Ni + Pi
2
)
+
(
PN ti × (1−
Ni + Pi
2
)
)
(3)
4 Simulation, algorithms, and parameters
In this section, first, we discuss the underlying assumptions of the simulation.
Then we provide an overview of two historical societies studied for simulation,
namely the English East India Company (EIC) and Armenian merchants of
New-Julfa (Julfa). Then we briefly discuss their aspects of interest for us and
the simulation procedures used to represent agents’ behaviour in these societies.
4.1 Assumptions
This paper is inspired by empirical studies on the importance and effects of
cognitive dissonance — tensions formed by conflicts between different cognitions
[4] — on agents’ behaviour. This leads to creating some justification for taking
one of the conflicting actions. Empirical studies attributed workers’ productivity
to cognitive dissonance formed by fairness of institutions [2]. Studies showed that
procedural justice (having fair dispute resolution mechanisms) [42], and payment
schemes (e.g. underpaying or overpaying) [1] impact agents’ behaviour. Also, as
discussed earlier, the impact of fairness of institutions on agents’ behaviour varies
based on their personalities.
4.2 Societies
Armenian Merchants of New-Julfa (Julfa): Armenian merchants of New-
Julfa were originally from old Julfa in Armenia. They re-established a trader
society in New-Julfa (near Isfahan, Iran) after their forced displacement in the
early 17th century [26]. They used commenda contracts (profit-sharing contracts)
in the society and also used courts to resolve disputes. The mercantile agents
were responsible for buying and selling items and moved among different nodes
of the trading network expanded from Tibet (China) and Manila (Philippines)
to Marseille (France) and Venice (Italy) [5].
The English East India Company (EIC): During the same time, the
English contemporaneous counterpart of Julfa (i.e. the English East India Com-
pany (EIC, AD 1600s-1850s)) had a totally different perspective on managing
the society. They built settlements for their mercantile agents to stay in India
[24]. Also, they paid their employees fixed wages and fired agents based on their
beliefs about their trading behaviour [25].
Note that the EIC’s trading period covers two events, namely a) granting
permission for private trade (1665-1669) and b) a significant budget deficit on
part of employees (around 1700). The EIC reduced its employees wages when
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granted the permission for private trade (i.e. fairness of the system had decreased
because agents’ already performed private trade without such a permission).
Furthermore, agents were desperate for their living costs because of the budget
deficit5. In the simulation model, we regenerate those events in iterations 70 and
100.
Fairness: Another difference between the two historical long-distance trad-
ing societies is associated with their payment schemes and adjudication pro-
cesses. The EIC rarely employed an adjudication process, and they paid low
wages to their employees [25]. However, in Julfa a mercantile agent was paid
based on his performance [5]. Julfans had adjudication processes to resolve dis-
putes considering available evidence [5]. However, the Julfa society had certain
characteristics that questioned its complete fairness — for instance, in the Julfa
society, the capital of the family was managed by the elder brother6 [26]. This
rule deprived younger brothers of managing their own capital.
Agent’s mobility: Another difference in the policy of the two historical
long-distance trading societies concerns whether or not the mercantile agents
stayed in a certain place to perform trades. In the EIC, the company built its
own factories and mercantile agents (but not sailors) resided there [24]. This
introduces issues such as forming an informal community within the company
that could have operated based on the norms of friendship [14].
Note that the events of years 70 and 100 are regenerated for unfair societies.7
Note that once private trade is permitted, the fairness of the society decreases
(because of a decrease in wages).
4.3 Algorithms
In this section, we discuss the procedures employed to use the above-described
model to simulate the two aforementioned societies. The simulation model is
split into four distinctive procedures and one sub-procedure. The first procedure
is the meta-algorithm that executes other algorithms in an appropriate sequence
and updates parameters required for them. The second procedure models the
societal level activities of the simulation, including creating an initial popula-
tion and staffing (hiring new recruits) to create a stable population. The fourth
procedure models mercantile agents’ decision-making and learning the system’s
parameters. The fourth procedure also includes a sub-procedure for defining new
parameters associated with hired mercantile agents. The fourth procedure covers
the decision-making and learning procedure associated with managers (i.e. mon-
itoring agents).
Algorithm 1 shows how the simulation is initialised, other procedures are
executed, and the system’s characteristics are modified. In iteration 0, the system
5 This deficit was because of lower wages and profits and higher living costs due to an
increase in the number of private traders as a consequence of formation of the New
East India Company (see p. 17 of [31]).
6 This rule helped the families to work like a firm.
7 Some discussions suggest that agents tend to break bureaucratic rules that seemed
to be harmless for organisation [19].
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Algorithm 1: Meta-algorithm
/* Intialise the system starting with iteration← 0. */
1 Create 500 new agents with status← new, random personality aspects, and
random parameters
2 Assign appropriate roles (i.e. mercantile, managers, and directors) to created
agents
/* Call algorithms in an appropriate sequence. */
3 repeat
4 Run Algorithm 2
5 Run Algorithm 4
6 Run Algorithm 5
7 if Private trade is legalised and iteration = 100 then Mercantile agents
feel desperate for basic living costs
8 iteration← iteration + 1
9 until iteration = 250
is initialised by creating 500 new agents with random parameters (line 1). The
roles are assigned to created agents (about 2% directors, 5% managers, and the
rest mercantile agents)8, and they have 0 years of experience (line 2). The rest
of the algorithm is repeated until the termination condition is met (lines 4-9).
Algorithm 2: Societal level set-up
/* n equals deceased and fired agents (mercantile agents and
managers) in the former iteration. */
1 The most experienced mercantile agents get promoted to a managerial role to
keep the number of managers constant.
2 Create n new agents status← new, Experiene← 0, randomly initialise
personality aspects and other parameters (discussed in Table 1)
In each iteration, the simulation begins with the societal algorithm (i.e. Al-
gorithm 2, line 4). Then the algorithm associated with the mercantile agents is
run (i.e. Algorithm 4). Note that the Algorithm 3 associated with the newly re-
cruited mercantile agents is called inside Algorithm 4. After 100 years, in unfair
system, private trades are legalised and the mercantile agents face financial issues
and feel financially desperate. This phenomenon was observed in the EIC after
a decrease in wages, coupled with fewer opportunities for private trade because
of the establishment of the New East India Company. Note that for simplicity,
when we modelled the phenomenon, we did not consider a gradual decrease (line
6). Finally, the simulation iteration increases by one, and the stop condition is
checked (line 8).
8 These numbers are inspired from the numbers in the EIC [24].
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Algorithm 2 shows how the societal level of the system is simulated. The
organisation hires and promotes agents to sustain the number of agents per role
— i.e. by replacing deceased agents (lines 1-2).
Algorithm 3: Initialising the mercantile agent’s algorithm
1 Fair ← RandomUniform(0, 1)
/* Rule-understanding and the internal belief about rules. */
2 Agent has a random perception of norms and rules
3 Status← Experienced
Algorithm 3 shows how the parameters of newly introduced mercantile
agents (i.e. new agents) are initialised. This algorithm is executed only for inex-
perienced agents (i.e. new recruits). An agent has a completely random under-
standing of the system’s characteristics (lines 1-2). After initialisation, the agent
updates its status to experienced so that the system can identify it (line 3).
Algorithm 4: Mercantile agent’s algorithm
/* Upadate parameters for new recruits. */
1 if Status = New then Set agent’s parameter using Algorithm 3
2 if Experience > 3 then
/* Make a decision on cheating using Equation 1. */
3 Cheat← 0
/* Viol is a set of random violations. */
4 foreach viol ∈ Viol do
5 util← Utility(viol)
6 if Util > Utility(Cheat) then Cheat← viol
7 if Desperate then
8 foreach Violation level do
/* Punishment of internal beliefs decreases significantly */
9 Change the costs of internal belief violations
/* Agent (I) increases the weight of fellows. */
10 WIj ←WIj × (1 + #Rnd(FriendIncrease)) ∀j∈frinds
11 if Moving to a new place then
/* Most of the former fellows are replaced with new fellows */
12 Replace Mob% of fellows with new fellows.
13 Learn system parameters and modify your internal belief and perceived norm
/* Agent may die */
14 Experience← Experience + 1
15 if Rand(1) ≤MortalityProbability(Experience + 15) then Die
Algorithm 4 shows the procedures associated with mercantile agents’ cog-
nition and decision-making processes. Note that in this algorithm #Rnd(x) in-
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dicates a random number generated in the interval (0, x). As stated earlier, if
the status of the mercantile agent is new, he goes through an initialisation algo-
rithm (i.e. Algorithm 3, line 1). Experienced mercantile agents decide whether
to cheat based on a set of potential violations (lines 2-6). Lines 7-9 model the
scenario when mercantile agents faced a decrease in wages and a drop in private
trade’s revenue such that they were desperate to pay for their living costs. As a
consequence, costs associated with violating the internal beliefs decrease (lines
7-9). Also, the mercantile agent increases the weight of social bonds with his
associated agents (line 10). And when moving to a new place, the majority of
a mobile mercantile agent’s work fellows (e.g. Julfans) are replaced (lines 11-
12). Finally, the mercantile agent learns system parameters, modifies his beliefs,
increases his experience, and dies with an estimated probability (lines 13-14).
Algorithm 5: Manager’s algorithm
/* Manager reports (and eventually punishes) a number of employees
who violate the rules of the organisation beyond its tolerance
level. */
1 PotPunish← employees with violations more than TolPunish
2 if The number of members of PotPunish > MaxPunish then
/* The manager has a limit for the number of agents he can punish
called MaxPunish. */
3 Punish MaxPunish out of PotPunish that have the most violation
4 else
5 Punish all PotPunish members.
6 Experience← Experience + 1
7 if Rand(1) ≤MortalityProbability(Experience + 15) then Die
Algorithm 5 shows the procedures associated with managers. A manager
creates a set that consists of violators with unacceptable violations (i.e. it toler-
ates violations to some extent, see line 1). Note that the manager reports about
the violators and punishes a certain number. If the number of violators exceeds
a certain threshold, it punishes the worst violators (lines 2-3). Otherwise, all
the violators are punished (lines 4-5). Finally, the agent’s experience and age
increase, and the agent may die (lines 6-7).
4.4 Simulation parameters
In this subsection, we discuss the important parameters employed in the simu-
lation (see Table 1), along with the justification for the parameterisation. Note
that we used 250 iterations to reflect the longevity of the EIC (it was active with
some interruptions and changes in power from 1600 to 1850). Each iteration thus
models one year of activity in these systems. In Table 1, column ‘Name’ indi-
cates the name of parameters, column ‘Comment’ shows additional information
if required, column ‘Distribution’ indicates the probability distribution of these
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parameters, and column ‘Values’ indicates the values of parameters estimated
for the two historical long-distance trading societies. Note that these parameters
can be easily revised to reflect other societies.
Table 1. Parameters associated with the model
Name Comment Distribution Values
Fairness Unfair : Fair Constant −0.4 : 0.6
Perception of fairness of system Uniform (−1, 1)
Rule monitoring
The lower bound (lb)
The learnt probabilities
Uniform
(0, 1)
(lb, 1)
Norm monitoring strength Uniform (0, 1)
Minor violation punishment Probability Uniform (0, 1)
Weight of the connections Fellows Uniform (0, 1)
Modifier for mental costs Cognitive dissonance Uniform (0, 0.3)
Modifier for connections Friendship Uniform (0, 0.2)
Fairness: Note that as stated earlier, Julfa had fairer institutions than the
EIC due to profit sharing and using adjudication processes. We set system fair-
ness for fair and unfair societies as 0.6 and -0.4, respectively. We believe that
neither of these two societies was completely fair or unfair (e.g. EIC managers
justified the firing of agents in their letters, which indicates some efforts towards
interactional fairness [25]).
Perception of fairness: An inexperienced agent has a completely random
understanding of system characteristics.
Rule and norm monitoring: The agents believe the more serious violations
are more likely to be punished. They use a Uniform probability distribution that
is identified by its lower and upper bounds. For the upper bound, they use 1
(i.e. completely violating the rule such as stealing all the money). However, they
are unsure about the lower bound for tolerance of peers and managers; hence,
a continuous Uniform probability distribution in (0,1) is used. For the strength
of the norm monitoring (i.e. how often agents punish each other), agents have a
random understanding. However, these parameters are updated by continuous
learning.
Minor violation punishment: In the model, we assume the agents have
doubts about being fired for minor violations. This doubt is modelled by using
uniform random numbers.
Weight of the connections: To model all the possibilities for new links,
such as knowing one another in advance, we used a random number (0,1) for
new friendship links and links between mercantile agents and middle managers.
Modifier for mental costs: When an agent violates a rule, it randomly
discounts the costs associated with such an action by a maximum of 10% of its
initial point and on average the initial costs decreases by 5% of its initial point.
Modifier for weights of connections: For changes in weights of connec-
tions, we increase the connection’s weight as a proportion of the current weight
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(i.e. weight × x). Due to the ongoing interactions, the weight of friendships
increases randomly between (0, 0.2).
Learning: Furthermore, we parametrise the agents’ learning as follows. Agents
discount past information using a weight of 30% (i.e. a weight of 70% for recent
information). This reflects the importance of recent information for agents, be-
cause they are not sure about the stability of the system’s behaviour in the long
run. Also, we use entrepreneurs’ personalities as a representative of personality
of these trading agents [46] (see Table 2).
Table 2. Tendency of personalities to be entrepreneurs and the impact of them on an
organisation’s performance
Big Five1 MBTI2 Intention3 Performance4
E E 0.11 0.05
O N 0.22 0.21
A F -0.09 -0.06
C J 0.18 0.19
1E: extraversion, O: openness to experience, A: agreeableness, C: conscientiousness.
2E-I: Extravert-Introvert dimensions, S-N: Sensing-iNtuitive dimensions, T-F:
Thinking-Feeling dimensions, J-P: Judging-Perceiving dimensions. Note that initials
show the aspect used — for instance, E is the degree to which the person has the
Extravert aspect. Note that as with their earlier study, we assume that results of
different tests are interchangeable (see Appendix of [45]).
3It shows the correlation between personality and the intention of the person to be
an entrepreneur.
4It shows the correlation between personality and the performance of the person
as an entrepreneur.
5 Results
In this section, we discuss the simulation results considering four different com-
binations of two characteristics, namely a) mobility of agents and b) fairness of
institutions.
We utilised NetLogo [44] to perform our simulation. We also used 30 dif-
ferent runs for each set-up and then averaged their results. Table 3 indicates
the characteristics for the four simulated societies and societies they represent.
The set-ups (i.e. societies) are identified by the first letter of the characteris-
tics, namely M and F that are representatives of the mobility of agents across
trading nodes (M) and fairness of the institutions (F), respectively. We used a
Boolean index to indicate whether such an attribute is included (i.e. 1) or not
(i.e. 0). Likewise, in the table, a tick indicates that the society possesses such an
attribute, and a cross indicates the society does not possess such an attribute.
In the absence of detailed knowledge, we assume an explorative approach that
starts off with a prototypical EIC configuration, and incrementally approximates
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the Julfa configuration by hypothesised intermittent society configurations. This
approach allows for a nuanced analysis of the individual influence factors, so as
to isolate their respective influence on the simulation outcome. Table 3 reflects
this by gradually modifying individual characteristics of the EIC (M0F0) society
towards the Julfa (M1F1). In the following figures, we use two vertical dashed-
lines that indicate the year that permissions for private trade was granted and
the year that agents face issues with their living costs (i.e. year 70 and 100,
respectively).
Table 3. System specification based on different characteristics
Characteristics
M0F0
(EIC)
M0F1 M1F0
M1F1
(Julfa)
Mobility 7 7 3 3
Fairness 7 3 7 3
Certain characteristics of societies impact agents’ tendencies to violate rules.
Figures 2a-2d present the percentage of mercantile agents who violated the rules
(i.e. cheaters) in a year. In these plots, the y-axis represents the percentage of
cheaters. As can be seen, the most influential characteristic is the fairness of in-
stitutions (Figure 2c versus 2d) that reduces the number of cheaters significantly.
Also, mobility of agents (Figure 2a versus 2b) reduces the number of cheaters
moderately. Note that as shown in Figure 3d, even in fair societies some cheaters
are available; however, this number is not noticeable because of high percentages
of cheaters in other configurations. Also changes in fairness of institutions (first
dashed-line) and financial issues that lead to an increase in the percentage of
cheaters.
Another important issue regarding cheating is the seriousness of a violation.
Figures 3a-3d present results for this phenomenon. In these plots the y-axis
indicates the average of the seriousness of violations of cheaters. As can be seen,
societies with fair institutions and the mobility of the agents had less serious
violations in the long-run. In other words, Figures 3a-3d indicate relatively the
same patterns with respect to the percentage of cheaters shown in Figures 2a-2d.
Note that the combination of these results indicates that, in a society with
unfair institutions where the agents reside in a node (e.g. the EIC), a higher per-
centage of agents cheat and the cheaters commit more severe frauds (i.e. frauds
with more costs for the company). Our model mirrors the results what was ob-
served in the EIC. For instance, the real EIC situation was much worse than
that of our simulation results. The following case is an example that indicates
another popular cheating mechanism (i.e. embezzlement) and its extent in the
system:
“The most common practice of partial defraudment in the Indies was
to enter large sums of money in the name of fictitious Asian merchants
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Fig. 2. Cheating frequency
as advance payment for goods and use the money to finance the private
trade of the servants.” [15, p. 466]
As Aslanian points out, the “cases of cheating and dishonesty are rarely
mentioned in Julfan correspondence” [5, p. 249] . Furthermore, based on the
historical evidence, he notes that blacklisting in Julfa was extended to cases
such as refusing to pay the share of taxes [5, p. 249, footnote 66]. This indicates
the honesty of Julfan traders that made it possible to boycott society members
for reasons other than violating trade rules.
Another instance concerns the historical evidence from the chartered compa-
nies (e.g. EIC) and Julfa to evaluate the patterns suggested by our simulation
results. The evidence is presented in the form of quotations from historians. The
passage below belongs to the EIC:
“There were even fraudulent attempts to charge the Company [EIC]
a higher price by buying it [pepper] during the cheap season and then
entering in the books the later price which had been raised by the demand
from private traders arriving late on the coast. In fact, the Court of
Directors felt so strongly about the expenses incurred at Tellicherry [sic]
under the management of Robert Adams that they were prepared to
abandon the settlement altogether unless the charges were drastically
reduced.” [15, p. 325]
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Chaudhuri notes that the reason for the court’s decision was a downswing in the
pepper market inside Europe [15]. However, this argument not only suggests the
cheating behaviour and acceptance of it, but it also points to the beliefs about
some coalitions.
6 Discussion, concluding remarks, and future directions
This study has presented a conceptual agent cognitive architecture inspired from
the BDI [10] and TPB [20] models to investigate the interactions of different
belief facets with institutions. More precisely, in this study we have used the
idea of different belief facets [20], along with their monitoring characteristics, to
model an agent’s decision-making process. Finally, in this study, we have used
the evidence from empirical studies to apply the cognitive architecture to the
context in a comparative simulation model of two historical long-distance trading
societies, namely Armenian merchants of new Julfa (Julfa) and the English East
India Company (EIC).
For simulating the aforementioned historical cases, we have considered two
characteristics of these systems, namely mobility of agents and fairness of in-
stitutions, which are central features for cooperation in long-distance trading.
The simulation results mirror the historical evidence for these two societies. The
results show that the fairness of institutions is a pivotal characteristic to deter
agents from cheating. Moreover, in a fair institutional setting, non-compliant
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agents cheated with less severity (i.e. imposed lower costs on the system). Also,
the increase in living costs (in iteration 100 — second vertical line), that led to
an increase in percentage of cheaters and the seriousness of cheats was because
of a decrease in costs associated with breaking internal beliefs (see Section 4.2,
footnote 5 and Algorithm 4, lines 7-9). This result emphasised the importance
of this aspect of agents’ cognition (i.e. internal beliefs) in following the rules.
Finally, as shown in Figures 2 and 3 (M1F0), mobility of agents helps the
organisation by lowering the inclination of agents to break rules. This is caused
by higher mobility, and thus fewer opportunities for agents to form strong friend-
ship bonds and express their real beliefs to each other; leading to overall higher
levels of compliance. The impact of fairness of institutions on agents behaviour
translates well in modern settings; in organisational studies it is referred to as
organisational citizenship (i.e. cooperative working environment) and counter-
productive work behaviour (i.e. agents deliberately decrease their cooperation)
[41]. The impact of internal beliefs (e.g. religions) on agents’ behaviour has also
been observed by political philosophers such as Machiavelli.9
As a future extension of the current study, detailed interactions between
other modules of the cognitive architecture presented in Figure 1 deserves more
attention. The societal model can be extended to take account of a wider range of
characteristics such as apprenticeship programmes, and considering the impact
of those on organisational profitability so as to sketch a more realistic picture of
these historical trading societies.
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